El cuento en el Perú, 2015-2017

Javier De Taboada Amat y León

doi:10.30920/letras.89.130.12

Authors

Javier De Taboada Amat y León Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos, Lima, Perú; Universidad Peruana de Ciencias Aplicadas, Lima, Perú http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8026-3817

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30920/letras.89.130.12

Abstract

The following article reviews a group of 30 short story collections published in Peru between 2015 and 2017. It takes into account the characteristics of the editions, the organization of contents, the most prevalent topics and some motifs or metaphors which recur in several of the collections.

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