Normality and Normativity in the Sense of Ownership of Self

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.30920/letras.97.145.7

Abstract

The aim of this article is to problematize the sense of ownership of the Self by considering experiences of normativity and normality from an embodied perspective. Through a phenomenological theoretical framework centered on phenomenologies of embodiment and phenomenological psychopathology, the topic is addressed in two stages.  In the first one, the analysis departs from two main points: the structural characteristics of the Self and their radicalization in the concept of perception introduced by Merleau-Ponty. The body, through its prereflective state, is conceived as an articulator of knowledge by way of its action and spatialization in the world. At the same time, it responds to the demands of the world through the adjustment of its behavior. Nevertheless, through disruptions of its normality as well as of its normativity, the body is compelled to be experienced reflectively as a sustained state.  This disruption, or shift in sense, is exemplified by the case of somatic delusion. In the second stage, the concept of dys-appearance introduced by Drew Leder is employed to clarify how states of illness or pain tend to render the problematic nature of the sense of ownership of the Self more explicit. This dynamic is especially intensified when lived experience is shaped by features associated with mental disorder within an environment in which features carry a prevailing normative load. 

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Author Biography

Stephanie Berenice Cordero Ramírez, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Stephanie B. Cordero (UNAM, México) es doctoranda en Filosofía por la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Su trabajo de investigación se centra en las implicaciones éticas del trastorno mental. Sus principales líneas de investigación incluyen la psicopatología fenomenológica, la filosofía de la psiquiatría y la filosofía de las emociones.

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Published

2026-04-30

How to Cite

Cordero Ramírez, S. B. (2026). Normality and Normativity in the Sense of Ownership of Self. Letras, 97(145), 130-147. https://doi.org/10.30920/letras.97.145.7

Issue

Section

Dossier 2026-1

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